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Abstract Over the past decade, climate change adapta-
tion has become an integral item on the climate policy
agendas of several European countries. As such,
researchers have begun to question what concrete changes
in polices are occurring at national levels and what
dynamics can explain these changes. While new laws,
policies and institutions have been created to deliver
adaptation, supported through processes of cross-national
policy innovation and learning, another interesting obser-
vation being made is that adaptation is steadily emerging
into a new separate and distinct policy field in a handful of
countries. The purpose of this article is twofold: first, to
empirically map where and to what degree adaptation is
emerging as a policy field; second, to theoretically and
empirically explore the drivers underpinning policy field
emergence. Based upon a survey of leading adaptation
policy makers in 27 European countries, we show that there
are signs of adaptation becoming a policy field in 15
countries. Furthermore, we find that even though institu-
tional change, coupled with increasing public attention and
pressure on governments to react to climate change, has
helped drive the emergence of adaptation as a policy field,
it would appear that it is the activities of elite policy
makers and experts that have had the most influence.
Keywords Climate change adaptation  Public policy 
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Introduction
Over the past decades, the topic of policy change has re-
ceived considerable attention. Moreover, it could be argued
that some of the most important theoretical frameworks in
the policy science literature, such as the advocacy coalition
framework (Sabatier 2007), the punctuated equilibrium
framework (Baumgartner and Jones 2009), and the multi-
ple streams framework (Kingdon 1984), have largely fo-
cused on understanding such change (Real-Dato 2009).
One plank of the argument in that literature is that policy
change comes in different sizes and shapes: Some changes
are incremental; others are more fundamental and some
could be even called paradigmatic (Hall 1993). Interest-
ingly, however, much of the academic debate over policy
change takes an important part of the context—the policy
field (policy domain, policy monopoly, policy subsystem,
policy area) in which such changes occur—as a given. For
instance, the advocacy coalition framework focuses on
‘‘subsystems’’ of the broader policy landscape, such as
environmental policy (Dryzek and Dunleavy 2009), but not
on the formation of these subsystems. The multiple streams
framework looks at the separate dynamics within a field (be
it transport, education or environment), determining how
they have influenced policy change. And analyses of policy
change through a punctuated equilibrium framework lens
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also looks at sudden changes inside established policy
fields such as energy (Colgan et al. 2011).
The lack of attention paid to policy fields as a whole is
not restricted to the leading models of policy sciences.
Reviewing a number of textbooks and handbooks on public
policy, we find that the term ‘‘policy field’’ is essentially
taken for granted; while frequently used, it is rarely defined
or treated as a relevant variable in understanding policy
dynamics. As a result, a crucial level of analysis for policy
change is missing. This is remarkable because, as Massey
et al. (2014) state, ‘‘policy fields represent the highest form
of state and citizen regulatory and governing capacity over a
particular topic…’’ (p. 7). Their existence (or absence) has
important implications on the type and delivery of public
and semipublic goods and the level of attention brought to
bear on any public problem (think of topics such as agri-
culture, health care or education). Additionally, stability is
added to the provision of these public goods as policy fields
tend to be populated by specialized organizations (e.g.,
ministries), associated with access and veto points to deci-
sion-making processes (e.g., a place at the table during
cabinet meetings). Given the consequential role, policy
fields play in a governing system coupled with the lack of
attention paid to them in the literature (where they come
from and how they emerge) opens up a unique opportunity
to expand scholarly understanding of policy change.
The purpose of this article is to begin to explore con-
ceptually and empirically how policy fields might emerge
at the national level, specifically using the issue of climate
change adaptation as a case. We focus on climate change
adaptation because, over the past decade, efforts to address
the growing impacts of climate change have become a
cornerstone of domestic and international climate policy
agendas (Ford and King 2013; Bauer et al. 2012; Keskitalo
2010; Neufeldt et al. 2009). Amid the flurry of policy
activity, which is especially visible within Europe,
researchers have begun to pose questions such as: What
concrete changes in polices are occurring at the national
level and what can explain these changes (Dupiuis and
Biesbroek 2013; Ford et al. 2013)? While new laws have
been enacted, new policies implemented, and new institu-
tions created to deliver adaptation, one of the more inter-
esting and perhaps significant observations in policy
change is that in the course of this activity, adaptation
appears to be steadily emerging into a new separate policy
field in a number of European countries (Massey et al.
2014). Such an observation demand we ask: How is this
policy change occurring? And what are the forces and
dynamics bringing this policy field to life? Since the study
of the origins and emergence of policy fields is scant in the
policy sciences literature (with the exception of Knoke
2004), our task is both novel and ambitious, conceptually
and empirically.
We begin our work at the conceptual level (‘‘A novel
framework for studying policy field emergence’’) by pre-
senting a testable definition of a policy field based on our
previous work (see Massey and Huitema 2013; Massey
et al. 2014). Then, we develop an original set of potential
explanations for the emergence of a policy field—harking
back to several conceptual traditions in political science.
Highlighting a set of potential factors that might explain
their emergence—such elite versus pluralistic activity, and/
or institutional path dependency. In ‘‘Results,’’ we turn
toward our empirical analysis. Working with the results of
an original survey of leading adaptation policy makers in
27 European countries, we first measure the degree to
which adaptation is emerging as a policy field in various
countries based upon our definition of a policy field. We
find that the degree of emergence is quite varied. Following
this we test the potential factors for policy field emergence
against our dataset. Finally, we analyze whether and how
the factors potentially related to the emergence of policy
fields have contributed to the varying degrees of adapta-
tion’s emergence in our case countries. What we find is that
even though institutional change, coupled with increasing
public attention and pressure on governments to react to
climate change, has helped drive the emergence of adap-
tation as a policy field, it would appear that it is the
activities of elite policy makers and experts that have had
the most influence. The article concludes with a discussion
of our findings, the limitations of this work and avenues for
future research.
A novel framework for studying policy field emergence
Policy field definition
While the term policy field and its synonyms policy
domain, policy monopoly, policy subsystem, policy area
have received limited attention in the literature, a handful
of loose descriptions of what they are have been put forth.
May et al. (2006) describe them as ‘‘established areas of
policy that give meaning to common problems and have
integrative properties.’’ Borrowing from Laumann and
Knoke (1987), Birkland (2011) states that they are ‘‘the
substantive area of policy over which participants in policy
making compete and compromise, such as the environ-
mental policy domain or the health domain.’’ Further,
Howlett et al. (2009), Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993)
and Baumgartner and Jones (2009) characterize them as a
constellation of actors, institutions and ideas within a
particular interest sector who put forth problem definitions
and solutions for that sector. (For similar descriptions, see
also Knoke 2004; Burstein 1991). Massey and Huitema
(2013) state, however, that policy fields can be seen as a
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state sanctioned unit of governing within the sociopolitical
system of a country where there exist so called ‘‘sub-
stantive authority,’’ ‘‘institutional order’’ and ‘‘substantive
expertise’’ working in tandem to support each other in the
management of a public issue or set of related issues (e.g.,
agriculture, defense, health care). Substantive authority
relates to the existence of policy products and outputs such
as policy programs, legislation and rules. Institutional order
can be seen as the government institutions that produce
substantive authority, such as ministries, ministerial offices
and parliamentary committees. And substantive expertise is
the manifestation of expert knowledge both inside and
outside government by people and institutions with a ves-
ted interest in a set of particular issues (e.g., policy issue
networks, NGOs, think tanks, etc.). What sets this defini-
tion apart from its predecessors is that it is the first work-
able description of a policy field, one that can be used to
test for potential policy field existence and emergence.
Conceptual framework
Having defined a policy field, the remaining questions are
how to understand adaptation’s emergence conceptually
and can such emergence be empirically mapped? To
answer these questions, we look at the possible emergence
of a policy field through three state-centered political sci-
ence theoretical lenses: pluralism, elitism and institution-
alism. The rationale is as follows. From our reading of the
policy science literature, the most dominant theories for
explaining policy dynamics and change are the punctuated
equilibrium framework, the advocacy coalition framework
and the multiple streams framework (see Real-Dato 2009).
While these three theories have explanatory capabilities for
how public policy works and ultimately changes, their
main focus is detailing agenda setting mechanisms and the
dynamics of change within existing, well-established pol-
icy fields and not how new fields themselves might begin to
emerge (Massey and Huitema 2013). Their unit of analysis
is a policy issue (e.g., strengthening of environmental
regulations, the introduction of green taxes) and not how
the field of environmental policy itself emerged. In
essence, the study of field emergence goes beyond agenda
setting and change. It picks up effectively where these
theories end to show how a policy issue can evolve into a
field.
Looking outside these dominant theories, attention
toward explaining the emergence of new policy fields has
received limited attention over the years. Knoke’s (2004)
work, probably the most well known, attempts to system-
atically theorize the genesis of new fields. Knoke suggests
that six key elements are necessary for a new field to
develop—focusing events, technological innovations,
political entrepreneurs, issue framing, policy networks and
policy domain institutionalization—and explains why each
is important to a field’s emergence. While he creates a
narrative of how these elements fit together, ultimately, he
takes an institutionalist perspective for policy field devel-
opment, arguing that new fields are simply a reconfigura-
tion of previous institutions. By doing so, he ignores the
role pluralistic or elitist forces may play. Similarly, policy
field emergence is addressed (albeit tangentially) in Wil-
liams’ (2009) work on the internationalization of Canada’s
financial services policy. Also writing in the institutionalist
vein, he states that new policy fields can emerge when
exogenous developments force two or more fields to
address a common policy problem in tandem. The result is
the creation of what he calls an ‘‘‘uber’ policy subsystem’’
(p. 23, original emphasis, original spelling), where the once
separate fields merge to create new institutions and a new
assembly of actors to address the problem (see also Jochim
and May 2010). Hints of policy field emergence can also be
found in recent work on policy innovation (see, for ex-
ample, Jordan and Huitema 2014; Schaffrin et al. 2014).
There, policy field emergence can be seen as a by-product
and/or outcome of policy innovation. And, while an
interesting finding, these authors also take a decidedly
institutionalist approach in explaining policy field emer-
gence, again sidestepping the role other frames might have
played.
Given this dearth in the public policy literature, we are
forced to expand our horizons and look to broader, more
fundamental theories of politics that seek to explain gov-
erning processes in sociopolitical systems (i.e., nation
states). The justification in exploring the role state-centered
theories of governing have played in the emergence of new
policy fields is (1) we define policy fields as a unit of
governing within the sociopolitical system of a state; (2) a
policy field is fundamentally a state or government spon-
sored set of institutional arrangements to deal with prob-
lems and issues in society; and (3) their emergence and
creation can be seen as an act of governing by the state and
subsequently, without state sanctions they would not exist.
In choosing the theoretical lenses the two most immediate
to come to mind are pluralism and elitism.
Since the mid-twentieth century, pluralism (see, e.g.,
Dahl 1967) and elitism (see, e.g., Mills 1956) have become
the two dichotomous theories to explain how liberal
democratic societies govern themselves, the role political
actors play in such societies, and in effect how policy is
made or changes. On the one hand, with pluralism the
power to enact policy change is diffused (horizontally and
vertically) throughout civil society, and despite there being
certain power imbalances, access to the policy process
remains open to all. On the other hand, with elitism access
to the policy process and the power to enact change is
portrayed as residing within a closed group of networks,
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cut off from the public, which serve their own political and
financial interest. A third lens which can also be explored is
institutionalism. Following in the wake of the pluralist vs.
elitists discussions, institutionalism (and it variants) has
also taken a solid hold in the debate of governance and
public policy (Schmidt 2006). Portraying the state/gov-
ernments, not so much as a constellation of actors working
toward some purpose, but rather as a combination or
ensemble of institutional arrangements into which political
actors are subsumed (Hay et al. 2006). Below we look
more in depth at these lenses and conceptually map out
how adaptation may have begun to emerge under each.
Pluralism
One can argue that contemporary pluralism, as complex
and multi-veined as it is (see Dryzek and Dunleavy 2009),
propounds that while ultimate decision-making authority
lies within the components of the state (legislative,
executive, judiciary), the ability and the power to shape and
influence governing decisions and ultimately policy is
spread throughout the polity. In essence, politics and
society are divided into multiple actors, interest groups
(active and latent) and institutions both inside and outside
government (Dahl 1967). Each group having ideas, inter-
ests and beliefs on how society should be governed, as well
as a valid voice in the governing process. Power and
expertise are spread across a variety of institutions which
interact and commune with each other. Pluralism stresses
the existence of an active civil society which can lobby
government through multiple channels and intones the
need for dialogue, debate and action. Political decisions are
the outcome of a majority of actors or groups reaching
consensus on an issue.
Applying a pluralistic lens to the development of
adaptation as a policy field, we would expect that it was
interest groups within civil society, and perhaps academia
that lobbied their governments to expand attention toward
adaptation, while battling others who considered the issue
less of a priority. We might also postulate that there were
organizations with knowledge and expertise about adapta-
tion that recognized the potential gravity of climate change
impacts. These organizations initially pushed adaptation on
the agenda and continued to lobby government on the need
to increase its role and oversight on the issue through the
creation of new and codified institutions and authority.
Elitism
In contrast to the open and inclusive approach to governing
that pluralism espouses, elitist theory takes the opposite
view stating that political and decision-making power rests
with small groups who are removed from those they govern
(Dryzek and Dunleavy 2009). Elites could be political
leaders, corporations, wealthy families and those in high
society. Through concentration of power and resources,
elites can exert their will so as to influence or prevent
changes in society. In the modern political science litera-
ture, two strains of elite theory have emerged: the ‘‘state-
craft approach’’ (Bulpitt 1986a, b) and the ‘‘policy
communities approach’’(Marsh and Rhodes 1992). Under
the statecraft approach, policy-making power sits solely in
the hands of the state among a small group of top political
party officials, civil servants and policy advisors whose
goal is to remain in elected office by appearing to make
competent policy decisions. On the other hand, policy
communities are a small, tight knit group of actors from
government, academia, professional organizations and
firms that share common interests and values over an issue
and have decision-making power over that issue. It should
be noted that under elite theory, ‘‘policy communities’’ are
distinct entities from the policy networks or issue networks
as explained by Howlett, Ramesh and Perl (2009). Where
policy communities are decidedly seen as an elite form of
governance, policy or issue networks are pluralistic be-
cause of their size and diverse membership (Evans 2006).
Through sharing respective resources (knowledge, exper-
tise, influence and finances), policy communities are able
to materialize their ideas into actions largely with the ex-
clusion of the public or broader government institutions
(Evans 2006; Marsh and Rhodes 1992).
Given that elite theory stresses a closed nature to gov-
erning, we assume that adaptation, despite being on the
agenda, was not a subject of public concern. Specifically,
we would expect there to have been a combination of in-
creased governing activity in the realm of adaptation with
an absence of discourse on, public demand for, and interest
groups around adaptation pushing for its expansion.
Similarly, within wider government circles, we would ex-
pect to find little activity. Rather there was a policy com-
munity of academics, senior politicians and senior
managers from economic/social organizations (e.g., insur-
ance companies) with their own knowledge, expertise and
mutual interest for adaptation. Within this community, we
might find the appearance of reports and academic papers
that could be attributed to a handful of authors. On the
government side, we might find that emerging regulations,
legislation and polices were championed by a limited
number of senior officials and that such outputs were in
some form ideologically or materially beneficial to just a
few economic/social organizations.
Institutionalism
Unlike pluralism which focuses on the interactions of
multiple groups or elitism which traces the actions of a
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limited few, modern institutionalism centers on the insti-
tutional landscape and how government and social insti-
tutions shape the political and social life. Under this
perspective, institutions are not to be thought of as simply
administrative organizations but more broadly as also
habits and norms of action that individuals and organiza-
tions come to adhere to over time, which are stable and
enduring in their operation (Goodin 2009). Moreover as
Young (2002) states, they are ‘‘sets of rules, decision-
making procedures and programs that define social prac-
tices, assign roles to the participants in these practices, and
guide interactions among occupants of individual roles’’ (p.
5). An institutional perspective implies that political and
social behavior is structured by relatively stable sets of
rules that make behavior predictable and that the types and
configurations of institutions define and set parameters for
courses of action (Ostrom 1986; Schmidt 2006).
Modern institutional theory can be aggregated along
three broad theoretical lines: normative/sociological, ra-
tional choice and historical (Lowndes 2002; Schmidt
2006). Because of its eclectic nature and explanatory
power, historical institutionalism (HI) is one of the most
widely used approaches among institutional scholars
(Lowndes 2002; Peters and Pierre 2006). Under HI, insti-
tutional patterns of governing operate along routine path-
ways that persist over long periods of time. New
developments can occur only when some form of external
pressure is exerted on existing institutional arrangements,
such as emerging problems (e.g., climate change impacts)
that they do not handle well in the eyes of administrators or
the relevant public. As a result, old institutions begin to
shift, with new institutions emerging to mitigate the pres-
sure. Paradoxically, this seems to imply that institutions
themselves are not the agents behind new institutions but
rather responders. Indeed, this lack of identifiable agency
has been a source of critique for HI (Peters et al. 2005).
This critique, however, might be mitigated under Giddens’
(1984) structuration approach. Also central to HI is the
concept of path dependence—the notion that previous
governing decisions and choices (intentional or not) will
roughly determine the boundaries for shaping future deci-
sions and arrangements. The notion of path dependence has
two consequences. First, that previous governing decisions
might in fact cause future pressures and problems that will
spark the development of new institutional arrangements.
Second, that path dependence can lead to institutional
vestiges whereby any new institutional arrangements will
contain elements of the old.
Taking an HI approach, how might we explain the
emergence of adaptation as a policy field? Firstly, given the
definition of a policy field we might assume that a policy
field an institution. Knowing that new institutions stem
from existing ones and that the dynamics are brought about
by emerging problems and pressures that the old institution
could not handle, we might assume that: (1) adaptation
would evolve out of previously institutionalized but related
policy fields (e.g., climate mitigation policy, land use
planning, disaster control or water management); and (2)
its emergence was a result of new problem pressures that
these fields could not sufficiently resolve. As a result new
forms of institutional order, substantive authority and
substantive expertise would begin to coalesce around the
new problems. Within this new institutional arrangement
called adaptation, we would also expect to find vestiges of
other policy fields.
While each of these lenses might serve as a plausible
explanation for the emergence of a policy field, one critical
assumption to be made is that adaptation was already on
the public agenda and that is was an existing, established
policy issue. Hence, when exploring policy field emer-
gence the key question is as follows: How did it move from
being an issue to being a field? Thus as previously men-
tioned, these theories pick up where previous theories of
agenda setting and change have left off.
Methodology
Survey design and respondent sampling
The analytical work was based on an original online cross-
national survey of 27 European countries. The survey itself
was part of a broader project studying the development,
innovation and diffusion of climate change adaptation
policy making across Europe (see Massey et al. 2014),
aiming to collect information and opinions of elite policy
makers working firsthand on national level adaptation
policy making.
The survey contained 25 questions (in open and closed
format) regarding the motivations behind adaptation, bar-
riers to adaptation, its institutional structure and the exis-
tence and types of national level policy documents (See
ESM1 for a copy of the survey). A particular set of ques-
tions was aimed at measuring the degree to which adap-
tation was a policy field in each country, while another
focused on the factors behind its emergence. Respondents
were identified from contact lists of European research
programs, existing databases, workshop and meeting lists
and through personal contacts. For each country, we sought
to select between two and five respondents to prevent
response bias. In total 106 respondents from 36 European
countries were invited to participate in the online survey. In
total 53 completed surveys were collected (response 49 %)
from 27 countries (75 % of countries approached).
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Data analysis: an overview
For the data analysis, the following steps were followed.
First, based upon the collected data, we calculated a raw
policy field score for each country (detailed description
follows below). These scores ranged from 0 to 25.2. The
raw scores were then normalized on a scale from .000 to
1.000 using the highest raw score 25.2 (UK) as our refer-
ence point of 1.000 to derive an overall policy field score
(PFS) for each country.1 Out of the group of 27 countries,
we removed all those that received a PFS of .000 (showing
no signs of adaptation as a policy field), thus reducing our
dataset to 15 countries. Next we divided and ranked the
countries into four groups based upon their PFS: Where
countries with a score between .750 and 1.00 were labeled
as showing ‘‘highly significant’’ signs of policy field
emergence; countries with a score between .500 and .750
as showing ‘‘significant’’ signs of policy field emergence;
countries between .250 and .500 as showing ‘‘moderate’’
signs of policy field emergence; and countries with a score
higher than .000 but below .250 labeled as showing
‘‘limited’’ signs of policy field emergence. We then ana-
lyzed the sample as a whole, based upon the scoring of the
survey responses, to see which (if any) of the factors
(pluralism, elitism, institutionalism) played a dominant
role. Additionally, we performed a regression analysis for
each factor on the 15 countries to see what (if any) relation
there was between the factors and the degree policy field
emergence. We then analyzed each of the four groups,
based upon their degree of emergence, in the manner as the
entire dataset.
Calculating the policy field scores
Using our definition of a policy field, in order to measure
the potential degree of its emergence requires measuring
the degree to which institutional order, substantive
authority and substantive expertise are present in a country
and provide each country with a total PFS. The score for
institutional order (IO) is based on the types and number of
national level government institutions devoted to adapta-
tion. Contingent on the types of institutions present (e.g.,
ministry, ministerial office), a score between .1 and 1 is
assigned. These scores are then summed to derive an
overall score for IO. The total score for substantive
authority (SA) is based on the number of socioeconomic
sectors that the national level adaptation legislation,
adaptation plans and policy programs cover, with each
sector receiving a score of 1. For example, if the national
adaptation program/legislation addressed only agriculture,
health and transportation, SA would score a 3. The overall
score of a can range from 1 to N. The logic being that a
higher score implies more robust SA and therefore a more
robust policy field. Substantive expertise (SE) is scored by
assigning a score between .1 and 1 based on the types of
non-government bodies (e.g., lobby groups, interest
groups) that work on adaptation in a country. These are
then summed to get an overall SE score. The scores for IO,
SA and SE are then summed to derive an overall PFS for a
country, with a higher total score representing, for our
purposes, evidence of more robust policy field emergence.
Scoring data were derived from the survey and then cross-
checked against national policy documents. For a detailed
methodology, see Massey et al. (2014).
Scoring the theoretical lenses
Given the broad nature of the survey and to avoid
‘‘respondent fatigue’’(see Ben-Nun 2008), we were only
able to quiz respondents on a handful of the factors under
each theoretical frame as detailed in Tables 1, 2, 3 above.
For each we asked them to rate on a scale of 1–5 with 1
being ‘‘not important at all’’ and 5 being ‘‘very important’’
how important a particular factor was in contributing to the
adoption of adaptation policies. For pluralism, we asked
respondents to rate the importance of factors such as in-
creasing public awareness to climate change impacts,
pressure from NGO’s and pressures from civil society. For
elitism, we asked them to rate issues such as internal
political pressure from senior political authorities and
senior ministries or offices. For institutionalism, we asked
them to rate the effectiveness of previous institutions in
dealing with adaptation, the idea that adaptation might be
more effective with new institutions, and the country’s
tendency to create new institutions. The aggregate of the
responses from each country were then scored and ranked.
Results
Measuring the degree of policy fields
Of the 27 countries surveyed, 15 showed a PFS above
zero.2 The results are presented in Table 4 below.
Looking at the results, not only do we find evidence that
adaptation is emerging as a policy field in a number of
countries, we also see that the degree of its emergence,
1 Previous research shows that adaptation can be considered an
emerging policy field in the UK (Massey and Huitema 2013;
Contestabile 2014).
2 Countries with a score of 0 (i.e., showing no signs of adaptation as a
policy field) include the following: Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Iceland, Ireland,
Italy, Slovakia and Slovenia.
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while varied, is rather evenly dispersed throughout the
sample. In five countries, we find that there is ‘‘significant
emergence,’’ five countries with ‘‘moderate emergence,’’
and four countries showing ‘‘limited’’ policy field emer-
gence. Only the UK shows ‘‘highly significant’’ emergence
on the scale we have constructed.
Influence of factors
Considering the sample of countries as a whole and making
no distinction as to the degree of the policy field, we looked
to see which factors (pluralism, elitism, institutionalism) (if
any) dominated and the difference in scores between the
factors. Working on a scale of 1–5, we see that elite
activity scored the highest with an average reported score
of 3.43 (13 % above the mean of 3), followed by pluralism
with 3.20 and institutionalism with 2.90 (see column ‘‘All’’
in Table 5).
However, the overall difference between the scores for
each factor was not greatly significant, with elitism scoring
7.2 % higher than pluralism, and pluralism scoring 9.4 %
higher than institutionalism. The greatest difference
between scores was elitism versus institutionalism marked
by an 18 % difference. These scores suggest that, even
though elite activity would appear to be the most influential
in the emergence of adaptation as a policy field for the
entire group and indeed an ‘‘important factor’’ in its own
right, all of the factors come into play given their score’s
close proximity to each other and the mean. It should be
noted, however, that if we look beyond the average score
for elitism, eight countries ranked elite activity with a score
of 4.00 or above. The average appears to be somewhat
Table 1 Assumptions and possible evidence for the growth of adaptation policy through Pluralism
Assumptions Possible evidence
Pluralism
Civil society organizations driving force for expansion of
adaptation
Existence of societal organizations (NGO’s, lobby groups, think tanks) that
had adaptation as part of their agenda/portfolio
Various organizations developing normative arguments for
greater government involvement in adaptation
Reports, academic papers, conferences, meetings, symposia
Groups pressure government to expand action—development of
narratives calling for broader intervention
Policy briefs, petitions, open letters, media articles/editorials, public
demonstrations
Govt. acknowledges groups engaging them in dialogue Meetings, public hearings, response letters to groups, speeches by govt.
official or politicians
Internal dialogue in govt. on courses of action to pursue Inter-ministerial meetings, steering groups, committees, parliamentary
debate, policy papers, new legislation or rules
Outcomes of govt. actions put up for public review Public consultations, publication of meeting minutes, publication of govt.
decisions
Table 2 Assumptions and possible evidence for the growth of adaptation policy through Elitism
Assumptions Possible evidence
Elitism
Adaptation was not an issue of public concern—lack of broad civil
discourse, limited number civil societal organizations working on
adaptation
No interest groups developing knowledge, no reports, papers,
meetings, symposia, etc.
Adaptation work was being discussed and developed by a small
number of identifiable organizations or individuals inside and outside
government
Identifiable policy community
Knowledge on expansion of adaption generated within identifiable
policy community
Reports and papers attributed to a small handful of authors. Meeting
and conferences with limited number of actors. Meetings attended by
the same actors
Within government, adaptation restricted to a single office or a handful
of senior officials
Proposed regulations, rules and legislation receive little public scrutiny
or debate and sponsorship can be attributed back to particular
individuals or a single office
Proposed government outcomes materially or ideologically benefit
members of the policy community, e.g., insurance and construction
companies
A limited number of companies received financial benefits as a result
of new government policy, e.g., expected annual costs to insurance
companies would decrease or increase in business for construction
companies
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skewed by the responses from Finland and Norway, each
giving elitism a 2.00. If these countries are removed, the
average score increases to 3.78. Also, no other factors
received a score of 4.00 or above from any country (see
Table 6).
Looking specifically at the scoring of factors as applied
to the different categorization of policy field emergence
(Table 6 above), the scores differ in some degree from each
other under each category and the group as a whole.
Looking first at the category of ‘‘highly significant PF
emergence,’’ we find again elitism scoring the highest with
4.00, followed by pluralism at 3.67 and institutionalism at
2.67. It should be noted that this category is represented by
only one country, the UK. Despite this, the ranking of
factors is the same for countries showing ‘‘significant’’
policy field emergence (n = 5), with elitism scoring at
3.56, pluralism 2.90 and institutionalism 2.43. The scores
for pluralism and institutionalism are the lowest in this
group, as compared to the others, and well below the av-
erage for the entire group of the 15 countries.
For countries showing ‘‘moderate’’ signs of PF emer-
gence, the ranking of scores is quite different. Here, we find
institutionalism scoring the highest at 3.31 (a 14 % dif-
ference from the average for the entire set of countries)
pluralism at 3.30 and elitism at 3.20. Admittedly, there is
only a miniscule difference between the scores for plural-
ism and institutionalism, suggesting that both are of equal
importance for this group. Also for this group, the differ-
ence in importance of elitism from the other factors is very
small, just 3 %. For those countries showing ‘‘limited’’
signs of PF emergence (n = 4), the ranking pattern for
scores of elitism, pluralism and institutionalism repeats
itself, respectively, 3.43, 3.33 and 3.01. Interestingly, the
score for elitism in this group is the same as the entire
dataset average while pluralism and institutionalism score
higher here than the full dataset average.
Table 3 Assumptions and possible evidence for the growth of adaptation policy through Institutionalism
Assumptions Possible evidence
Institutionalism
Adaptation evolved out of preexisting related policy fields such
climate change mitigation, land use planning, disaster control or
water management
Early documents, reports and discussion on adaptation would be linked
to or embedded in other policy field documentation. Experts in other
fields began working on adaptation. Adaptation on the meeting
agendas of other policy fields
Magnitude of problem perceived too large for related policy fields to
solve. New narratives created on the inability of policy fields to solve
climate change problems
Documents, meetings and speeches questioning capabilities of other
related policy fields to deal with newly perceived climate problems.
The practices and procedures of the fields offer no answer to
adaptation problematique
Normative understanding or agreement inside and outside government
that problem should be addressed
Declarative documents and statements calling for new government and
non-government institutions for adaptation
New institutional arrangements emerge from related preexisting policy
fields that begin to address problem pressure
People and resources from other related policy fields would be shifted
to and involved in new so called adaptation venues
Table 4 Distribution of policy field scores by country and degree of emergence
Highly significant PF emergence
.75 B PFS B 1
Significant PF emergence
.50 B PFS\ .75
Moderate PF emergence
.25 B PFS\ .50
Limited PF emergence
0\PFS\ .25
United Kingdom 1.00 Spain .671 Portugal .480 Germany .238
France .619 Belgium .437 Norway .238
Lithuania .571 Hungary .437 Sweden .198
Finland .567 Denmark .397 Netherlands .159
Switzerland .500 Austria .286
Table 5 Factor scores sorted by degree of policy field emergence in all countries
All Highly significant PF emergence Significant PF emergence Moderate PF emergence Limited PF emergence
Pluralism 3.20 3.67 2.90 3.30 3.33
Elitism 3.43 4.00 3.56 3.20 3.43
Institutionalism 2.90 2.67 2.43 3.31 3.01
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Discussion and conclusion
This article opened with two broad lines of inquiry. First,
recognizing that adaptation is emerging into a policy field
in multiple European countries, we sought to quantify its
degree as a policy field in nation states based upon a
derived policy field score. What we found is that out of the
27 countries analyzed, one country shows ‘‘high sig-
nificance’’ of adaptation as a policy field, five ‘‘significant’’
signs, five ‘‘moderate’’ signs, and four ‘‘limited’’ signs
based upon our model. This would suggest that institutional
order, substantive authority and substantive expertise are
beginning to coalesce in varying degrees around adapta-
tion. Second, we sought to explore conceptually and
analytically how and if various factors representing dif-
ferent families of state-centered political science theories
might explain the emergence of adaptation as a policy field
in countries. What we observe is that for the entire sample
of 15 countries, elite activity appears to be the most
dominant factor driving its emergence. However, when
looking at the countries in light of the degree of emergence,
the results are not uniform as institutional change appears
more dominant for those countries showing ‘‘moderate’’
signs of PF emergence.
Emergence of adaptation as a policy field: discussion
and future directions
As stated above, the existence, and we might say, extent of
adaption as a policy field in a particular country could have
important implications for the practice and delivery of
adaptation policy. As Massey and Huitema (2013) argue,
where policy fields are more mature the problems/issues
the field addresses will, in all likelihood, be dealt with in a
systematic and structured manner rather than ad hoc. This
is because of greater institutional capacity, a greater degree
of authority, money, stability and civic attention being
brought to bear on the issue. Also, more generally with an
eye toward the study of public policy, they note that new
policy fields can foster new forms of governance, including
new and innovative instruments never seen before (see also
Jordan et al. 2003). With this in mind, a number of ques-
tions come to the fore when looking at the variation of the
degree of emergence in our dataset. First, is adaptation
actually being carried out more effectively in those coun-
tries with a higher PF score? Second, is there evidence of
new forms of governance and new instruments brought
about by adaptation activity and is there variation among
countries with different PF scores? Lastly, we might ask
whether adaptation ‘‘effectiveness’’ can actually be mea-
sured considering that many of the policies implemented
are in expectation of projected climate change impacts.
Ford and King (2013), while not using the term ‘‘effec-
tiveness’’ explicitly, put forward a conceptual framework
to assess what they call ‘‘adaptation readiness’’ or a
country’s level of preparedness to respond to climate
change impacts. An interesting line of research would be to
apply their framework across the range of countries in our
dataset to see, indeed, if countries showing a higher sig-
nificance of PF emergence differ in terms of ‘‘readiness,’’
from those countries showing limited PF emergence.
Influence of factors
Looking at our data, we might say that no one factor or lens
heavily dominates the discussion on adaptation’s emer-
gence as a policy field. While elite activity appears to be
the most important factor for the entire dataset, and for
Table 6 Scores for each factor
behind policy field emergence
by individual country
Country Normalized PF score Pluralism Elitism Institutionalism
Austria 0.286 3.03 3.63 2.47
Belgium 0.437 3.67 3.00 2.00
Denmark 0.397 2.33 4.00 3.17
Finland 0.567 3.00 2.00 2.67
France 0.619 3.67 4.80 2.00
Germany 0.238 3.67 3.00 2.67
Hungary 0.437 2.77 3.00 3.17
Lithuania 0.571 2.33 4.00 3.17
Netherlands 0.159 3.73 4.70 3.10
Norway 0.238 2.57 2.00 3.43
Portugal 0.480 3.33 4.00 3.67
Spain 0.671 2.33 4.00 2.00
Sweden 0.198 2.83 4.00 3.17
Switzerland 0.500 3.17 3.00 2.33
United Kingdom 1.000 3.67 4.00 2.67
Climate change adaptation 561
123
three out of the four degrees of PF emergence (highly
significant, significant, and limited), pluralism is a close
second in terms of importance for the entire set, as well as
for three out of the four degrees of emergence (highly
significant, moderate and limited). Curiously for moderate
PF emergence, we find that elitism scores the lowest and
institutionalism the highest, the only group to display such
results. How then might we interpret these scores? Should
the group of moderate PF emergence be seen as an outlier?
On the one hand, we might dismiss this group as such. On
the other hand, if we regard adaptation as a policy field
emerging in phases (it began as a nonexistent PF then
gradually moved along through each stage to reach
maturity), then the following narrative can be
hypothesized.
In phase one, when adaptation first began to emerge, it
was an issue largely being pushed for and promoted by
elite policy communities and/or top political officials and
policy advisors. They were in effect the spark and the
engine to start promoting adaptation as more than just a
policy issue, advocating for institutional change so as to
create new norms, rules and entities to support their vision.
In phase two, when adaptation reached a level of moderate
emergence, institutional change previously advocated by
elites begins to be implemented and its effects pronounced
on the new field’s expansion. This could account for
institutionalism being the highest ranked factor among this
group of countries. In phase three, where we see significant
PF emergence, new institutions are established and elite
activity once again becomes significant. Here, elites begin
evaluating changes taking place, while exerting pressure to
see that the changes they advocated for are being suc-
cessfully implemented. When adaptation reaches a level of
high significance (the final phase), the broader network that
evolved around adaptation begin to recognize and
acknowledge the efforts elites invested into adaptation, not
only at its onset but throughout its emergence. In short, we
might hypothesize the dynamics of adaptation’s emergence
as a PF as such: (Phase 1) advocating and promoting
institutional change by elites; (Phase 2) implementation of
institutional change; (Phase 3) evaluation and oversight of
institutional change by elites; (Phase 4) acknowledgment
and recognition of elite’s effort to enact policy change.
Such a hypothesis, however, is not complete without a
fuller treatment of the factors of pluralism and institu-
tionalism. Given that all the countries observed are liberal
democratic societies (13 are EU Member States), we might
assume that elite policy communities are not entirely
divorced from the public they serve and that they actively
seek feedback on the policy changes they promote. As
such, even though we hypothesize that it was elites that
drove adaptation’s expansion, their actions were largely
supported (or at least not opposed) by their constituencies.
Therefore, pluralist activity might be seen as the bedrock
on which the policy field is being built. This in turn could
explain the reported scores for the pluralist factors. As for
the scores related to institutional versus elite factors, with
the exception of those countries showing moderate PF
emergence, we might say that the institutions involved in
adaptation’s emergence are simply the recipients for and
the outcomes of decisions made by elite and pluralistic
forces. Such an explanation certainly reinforces the concept
that institutions themselves lack agency; in such a scenario,
this conclusion is plausible based upon the data. That said,
this hypothesis needs to be tested with a larger dataset.
Limitations and future directions: exploring other
factors for policy field emergence
While our research design only allowed us to focus on
exploring three state-centered political science theories,
another possible lens to be explored in future research is
Public Choice theory and the role it might have played in
adaptation’s emergence. Public Choice relies upon the
application of economic market theory to explain political
and social behavior. Under this theory, government policy
is enacted to correct for imbalances or failures in the
market. Given that a policy field is in large part a gov-
ernment sponsored entity closely linked to the economy,
we might assume that under a strict interpretation of public
choice the creation of a policy field was an act to regulate
and control for market failure (Majone 1994). Therefore,
the expansion of adaptation from a policy issue to a policy
field is a government response to address some form of (1)
information failure, (2) positive or negative externality
and/or (3) provisioning of public goods.
Another aspect not mentioned in our research is the role
of the EU. Despite having constrained our analysis to the
national level, our study does focus on Europe. Given then
the changes in governance brought about by the increasing
influence of the EU (see Jordan and Schout 2006), the
greater degree of interconnectedness between Member
States, and the EU’s concerted effort to promote adaptation
across the Union, it would prove interesting for future work
to include the EU’s role into the scenarios of pluralism,
elitism, institutionalism (and public choice).
Finally, even though this research focused on exploring
the factors through which adaptation might have emerged
as a policy field, future research should also focus on
explaining why or why not it is emerging as a policy field.
A broad brush answer might be related to problem pressure
or the perceived severity of climate impacts, and a coun-
try’s ability to effectively respond. As such we might
postulate that countries with a higher degree of a policy
field might have had higher climate-related damage costs
from extreme weather events (floods, fires, storms) than
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those with a lower degree. However, looking at the per
capita damage costs for each group of countries from 2000
to 2013, we find that that while the UK (highly significant
PF emergence) had the highest cost per capita at $352
USD, the lowest was for countries showing significant
signs of PF emergence, with $235 USD. Costs for countries
with moderate and limited signs of PF emergence were
$318 USD and $267 USD, respectively.3 The relative
similarity of the costs across all groups of countries and the
lack of a discernible pattern to the costs suggest that other
factors are at work. These might include the publicity or
visibility afforded to extreme weather events as opposed to
the actual cost of the events or the frequency at which the
events occur.
Conclusions
Our work represents the first conceptual and empirical
attempt to hypothesize how policy fields might emerge. By
cracking the door open with our broad brushstroke analy-
sis, we hope to lay the foundations for future work that is
deeper and more refined in its investigation, not only of
policy field emergence but equally climate change adap-
tation. The study of policy change is too often limited to
changes within fields. By expanding our focus toward field
emergence, we are hoping to capture a completely different
dynamic of governance as it relates to large-scale policy
change. In relation to adaptation, given climate change has
been characterized as one of the greatest challenges of the
twenty-first century, how governments choose to govern
adaptation will significantly influence their ability to
respond to climate pressures. Studying what and how
countries have done thus far can offer guidance for those
just beginning to undertake adaptation.
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